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Mining sector investments in Africa can be structured so
that the continent may benefit from climate policy in developed countries that puts a global price on carbon. Current supply chains rely on complex, specialized networks
where different parts of the production process are located in different regions of the world. This system of global
value chains5 leads to greenhouse gas emissions through
cross-border transportation and excess waste (especially
in electronics and plastics). There is some evidence that
border tariffs harm vertical specialization, where different
regions are specialized in a very specific task.6 Therefore,
carbon pricing, including carbon border tax, could lead to
the localization of value chains. Multinational companies
may move intermediate stages of production closer to the
source of mineral extraction, providing a boost to foreign
investment across Africa. The incentive for companies to
shrink these value chains is even higher in the aftermath of
the COVID-19 pandemic, which exposed some of the risks
of relying on extensive global supply networks.7 These
global trends sit within a broader and relatively recent
context of soaring environment, social, and governance
(ESG) investment affecting companies, shareholders, and
governments alike.
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World Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains: Investment
and Trade for Development (New York and Geneva: United Nations,
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covid-19-impacts-to-metals-prices-the-end-of-the-beginning.

2 | COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT

The 2009 Africa Mining Vision (AMV)8 provides guidance
for the industrialization of African countries by leveraging their mining sector. However, the global context has
changed since its crafting and, consequentially, it does
not include guidance on how governments should embrace the climate change agenda as an opportunity for
better and further industrialization, deeper linkages, and
sustainable development. Its neglect of climate change
does not mean that the AMV is no longer relevant. On the
contrary, its focus on skills and technology development is
more important than ever to seize the opportunity of the
localization of the global value chains, a trend that is still
weak in many jurisdictions where critical minerals for the
energy transition are produced. Moreover, the AMV’s focus
on harmonizing mineral policies across sub-regional blocs
and the continent would also serve countries well, given
that the global energy transition would be determined not
so much by national endowments of critical resources, but
by the regional and continental dynamics of technology,
skills, and governance systems.
There are many ways to look at the implications of international climate change policy for Africa, including through
the increased extraction of minerals needed in clean energy application9 and the greening of mines.10 The localization of global value chains—induced by a rising carbon
cost and by the desire to build resilience in supply chains
in light of increased pandemic risks—provides another
set of opportunities. Seizing this momentum will require
policy guidance to ensure that the relocation of industries
in global value chains occurs upstream (closer to mineral
sources) rather than downstream (closer to final consumers). An open acknowledgment of the impact of climate
change on the shifting global value chains for critical minerals and the need to broaden the governance framework
to include the emerging role of sustainability and ESG requirements should form the foundation for a revised and
revitalized AMV.

8 Africa Mining Vision (African Union, 2009), https://au.int/sites/
default/files/documents/30984-doc-africa_mining_vision_english.
pdf.
9

Perrine Toledano, Martin Dietrich Brauch, Solina Kennedy, and
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Transition, Not All Critical Minerals Will Be Goldmines (Columbia
Center on Sustainable Investment, 2020). https://scholarship.law.
columbia.edu/sustainable_investment_staffpubs/7.

10 Nicolas Maennling and Perrine Toledano, The Renewable Power
of the Mine: Accelerating Renewable Energy Integration (New York:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, 2018), https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/sustainable_investment_staffpubs/77.
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Evidence for rising carbon prices and its effect on
value chain localization
There are currently 64 regional carbon pricing initiatives,
covering over 22% of global emissions,11 up from 16 initiatives covering less than 5% of emissions since the AMV was
adopted in 2009. The largest scheme so far, by revenue, is
the European Union’s (EU) internal cap-and-trade system,
the Emissions Trading System (ETS) but other countries
and sub-national regions are following suit.12 China, for
instance has made forward moves towards carbon prices,
working on draft regulations, conducting regional pilots,
and implementation a national cap-and-trade system
starting trading this year.13 Carbon prices and the scope of
the carbon pricing schemes are on the rise everywhere and
in particular in Asia. The EU ETS has undergone reforms
that stabilized its carbon price at USD 27/CO2e in 2019; it
might be further reformed this year in the context of the
EU’s commitment to reach carbon neutrality by 2050.14
Despite these increases in carbon prices globally, some
policymakers continue to object to them due to their effects on domestic competitiveness. To address this, a
key component of the EU Commission’s new agenda is a
Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM); the Commission submitted the idea to public consultation and
plans to adopt a proposal for an EU directive in the second quarter of 2021.15 The CBAM would impose a tariff on
any product imported from a country without a carbon
pricing plan.
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“Carbon Pricing Dashboard,” The World Bank (website), The World
Bank, https://carbonpricingdashboard.worldbank.org.
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Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 117, no. 16 (April
2020): 8804-8812, doi:10.1073/pnas.1918128117.
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Reuters Staff, “China’s National Emissions Trading May Launch in
Mid-2021 - Securities Times,” Reuters, January 11, 2021, https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-china-climatechange-ets-idUSKBN29G083.
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World Bank, State and Trends of Carbon Pricing (Washington,
DC: World Bank, 2020), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/
bitstream/handle/10986/33809/9781464815867.pdf.

15

Bentley B. Allan, “The E.U.’s Looking at a ‘Carbon Border Tax.’
What’s A Carbon Border Tax?” The Washington Post, October 23,
2019,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/10/23/
eus-looking-carbon-border-tax-whats-carbon-border-tax;
“EU Green Deal (Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism),”
European Commission (website), European Commission,
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/
initiatives/12228-Carbon-Border-Adjustment-Mechanism.

Given that freight transportation accounts for 7% of the
global CO2 emissions, and the total CO2 emissions from
freight transportation are estimated to quadruple by
2050,16 there is a strong incentive for regulators to include
the carbon cost of transportation, packaging, and waste
in the final product carbon footprint that is subject to tax.
While the complexity of carbon accounting along the value
chain complicates its implementation,17 game theory research suggests that even the threat of border taxes could
lead to a waterfall effect with other nations applying and
increasing domestic carbon prices, so that they capture
the revenue domestically.18 Moreover, research is already
on the way to harmonizing carbon accounting methods.19
In light of these developments, a border-adjusted carbon
tax system, accompanied by an increase in global carbon
prices, can fundamentally reshape global value chains.
Companies have been serious about reducing the emissions in their operations in response to the threat of rising carbon costs. Some companies, like Apple, Microsoft,
Shell, and Volvo, have decided to reduce emissions from
their entire supply chains, not just their own direct emissions. Apple’s carbon neutrality pledge puts specific emphasis on reducing the emissions in their materials supply
chain.20 More than 1,200 companies worldwide are either
16

World Bank, World Development Report 2020: Trading for
Development in the Age of Global Value Chains (Washington, DC:
World Bank, 2020), https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/
wdr2020.

17

Samuel Kortum and David Weisbach, “The Design of Border
Adjustments for Carbon Prices,” National Tax Journal 70, no. 2
(2017): 421–446, https://doi.org/10.17310/ntj.2017.2.07; Oliver
Schenker, Simon Koesler, and Andreas Löschel, “Taxing Carbon
along the Value Chain. A WIOD CGE Application” (2012), http://
www.wiod.org/conferences/groningen/slides/Schenker_slides.
pdf; Tomasz Koźluk and Christina Timiliotis, “Do Environmental
Policies Affect Global Value Chains?,” OECD Economics Department
Working Papers, No. 1282, (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2016), https://
doi.org/10.1787/5JM2HH7NF3WD-EN.

18

Dieter Helm, Cameron Hepburn, and Giovanni Ruta, “Trade,
Climate Change, and The Political Game Theory of Border Carbon
Adjustments,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 28, no. 2 (Summer
2012): 368–394, doi:10.1093/oxrep/grs013.

19

The Coalition on Materials Emissions Transparency (COMET) aims
to provide visibility into supply chain emissions of materials industries, including aluminum, cement, copper, iron ore and steel, and
plastics. See “The Coalition on Materials Emissions Transparency
(COMET),” Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
(website),
CCSI,
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/work/projects/
the-coalition-on-materials-emissions-transparency-comet.
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Apple’s carbon neutral pledge puts spotlight on metals. Ellie
Saklatvala, “Apple’s Carbon Neutral Pledge Puts Spotlight on
Metals,” Argus, July 22, 2020, https://www.argusmedia.com/en/
news/2125291-apples-carbon-neutral-pledge-puts-spotlight-on-
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pursuing internal carbon pricing or preparing to do so.21
Notably, BP has recently revised its carbon prices for the
period to 2050, and these now include a price of US$ 100/
tCO2e in 2030.22 More than 2,000 companies have joined
“We Are Still In,” a group of businesses, cities, states and
universities that commit to the Paris Agreement. Together,
they compose half of the U.S. carbon emissions and represent 68% of U.S. GDP as well as 65% of the U.S. population.23 Self-interest is one contributing factor furthering
this movement: climate change constitutes a real ESG risk
to the operations of these large companies. In January
2020, Larry Fink, the CEO of BlackRock, the largest asset
manager in the world, declared that “climate risk is investment risk”24 Climate Action 100+, a nonprofit group of over
300 large investors, helped persuade three of the world’s
largest mining and steel companies, ArcelorMittal, Thyssenkrupp and BHP, to commit to becoming carbon neutral
by 2050.25 As of February 2021, nearly 80 global companies
have pledged to reach carbon neutrality by 2050.26 The significantly increased focus from global capital and financial
markets on climate- and ESG-related issues tends to induce structural changes in many productive sectors, particularly affecting mining and energy investments in Africa
metals; Apple, Environmental Progress Report: Covering Fiscal Year
2019 (Apple, 2020), https://www.apple.com/environment/pdf/
Apple_Environmental_Progress_Report_2020.pdf.
21

“Internal Carbon Pricing,” Center for Climate and Energy Solutions
(website), Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, https://www.
c2es.org/content/internal-carbon-pricing.
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BP, “Progressing Strategy Development, BP Revises Long-Term
Price Assumptions, Reviews Intangible Assets and, as a Result,
Expects Non-Cash Impairments and Write-Offs,” June 15, 2020,
https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/news-and-insights/
press-releases/bp-revises-long-term-price-assumptions.html.

23

Rebecca Henderson, “The Unlikely Environmentalists: How the
Private Sector Can Combat Climate Change,” Foreign Affairs 999,
no. 3 (May/June 2020), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
world/2020-04-13/unlikely-environmentalists.

24

Larry Fink, “Larry Fink’s Letter to CEOs,” BlackRock, BlackRock, Inc,
2021, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/
larry-fink-ceo-letter.

25

Climate Action 100+, Asia Investor Group on Climate Change,
Ceres, Principles for Responsible Investment, Investor Group on
Climate Change, and The Institutional Investors Group on Climate
Change, “Climate Action 100+ Investors Seek Net Zero Business
Strategies Through Company Engagement,” October 2019, https://
www.iigcc.org/media/2019/10/Press-release-for-CA100-progressreport-300919.pdf.

26

Grace Melville, “Following the UK Government’s Announcement
to Be Net Zero by 2050 Many Businesses Have Set Their own
Ambitious Targets to Tackle Climate Change,” Carbon Intelligence,
Carbon Credentials Energy Services Limited, February 5, 2021.
https://carbon.ci/insights/companies-with-net-zero-targets.
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that are connected to global supply chains.27
Moreover, there is not much evidence in literature to support the argument that companies are looking to avoid
carbon taxes by moving their operations to less regulated
countries. Several research projects, including by the World
Bank,28 conclude that carbon costs do not lead to the exploitation of carbon havens, suggesting that multinationals will take the rise in carbon cost seriously. They should
further adapt their production process, including reducing
the carbon bill coming from the reliance on transportation
to freight intermediate products from site to another. Evidence from Chile already demonstrates how large emissions reductions can be achieved through the localization
of the copper value chain.29 Multinationals are therefore
likely to consider supply chain localization in response to
the pressure to reduce their upstream emissions. This localization trend will be amplified as companies respond
to COVID-19, as noted by the Intergovernmental Forum on
Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development.30
27 Lindsay Delevingne, Will Glazener, Liesbet Grégoir, and Kimberly
Henderson, “Climate Risk and Decarbonization: What Every Mining
CEO Needs to Know,” McKinsey and Co., Sustainability, January
28,
2020,
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/
sustainability/our-insights/climate-risk-and-decarbonizationwhat-every-mining-ceo-needs-to-know.
28

Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition, Report of the High-Level
Commission on Carbon Pricing and Competitiveness (Washington,
DC: World Bank, 2019), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/
handle/10986/32419; Ben McWilliams and Georg Zachmann, A
European Carbon Border Tax: Much Pain, Little Gain (Bruegel, 2020),
https://www.bruegel.org/2020/03/a-european-carbon-bordertax-much-pain-little-gain; Warwick J. Mckibbin, Adele C. Morris,
Peter J. Wilcoxen, and Weifeng Liu, “The Role Of Border Carbon
Adjustments In A U.S. Carbon Tax,” Climate Change Ecomonics
9, no. 1 (2018), doi:10.1142/S2010007818400110; Helene Naegele
and Aleksandar Zaklan, “Does the EU ETS Cause Carbon
Leakage in European Manufacturing?” Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 93, (2019): 125-147, doi:10.1016/j.
jeem.2018.11.004; Antoine Dechezleprêtre and Misato Sato, “The
Impacts of Environmental Regulations on Competitiveness,”
Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 11, no. 2 (Summer
2017), doi:10.1093/reep/rex013.

29

Gino Sturla-Zerene, Eugenio Figueroa B., Massimiliano Sturla,
“Reducing GHG Global Emissions from Copper Refining
and Sea Shipping of Chile’s Mining Exports: A World WinWin Policy,” Resources Policy 65 (March 2020), doi:10.1016/j.
resourpol.2019.101565.

30

The Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and
Sustainable Development (IFG), Isabelle Ramdoo, “The Impact of
Covid-19 On Employment In Mining,” Covid-19 Response Series
(Ottawa: International Institute for Sustainable Development
(IISD), 2020), https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/
covid-19-employment-mining-en.pdf.
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There is a need for research on how Africa can
make the most of this trend
Africa is a major source of many minerals that are likely
to face large demand growth in the future, especially in
the clean energy sector. The World Bank’s Climate-Smart
Mining report published in 2020 claims that the green
transition will be mineral intensive and that the demand
for graphite, cobalt, and lithium may increase by 500%
by 2050. A large proportion of these minerals are found in
many African countries such as the Democratic Republic of
Congo (cobalt), Gabon (manganese), Madagascar (graphite), Zambia (copper), and Zimbabwe (lithium).31 The localization of mineral-based global value chains presents an
opportunity for Africa to industrialize. There is some evidence supporting a high localization potential in Africa for
solar photovoltaic and wind energy value chains, given the
right conditions.32
Despite these reasons to believe that there might be opportunities for Africa arising from increases in carbon prices, there is limited knowledge about the effects of carbon
costs on supply chain localization. There are also gaps in
knowledge about how likely it is for Africa to benefit from
this shift and which industries have high localization potential in Africa. Filling these knowledge gaps is crucial to
developing an updated industrialization plan for Africa.
Moreover, there is a need to understand roles that stakeholders can play that the AMV had not envisaged. For the
longest time possible, mineral resource governance in Africa has played out within the arena of public sector institutions and private companies negotiating concessions for
resource exploitation and management. Little attention
has been paid to the role of company boards, shareholders, and private sector regulators (such as the stock market
31

Kirsten Hund, Daniele La Porta, Thao P. Fabregas, Tim Laing, and
John Drexhage, Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity
of the Clean Energy Transition (World Bank, 2020), http://pubdocs.
worldbank.org/en/961711588875536384/Minerals-for-ClimateAction-The-Mineral-Intensity-of-the-Clean-Energy-Transition.pdf.

32

Department of Energy of the Republic of South Africa, “Integrated
Energy Plan,” Staatskoerant, November 25, 2016, http://www.
energy.gov.za/files/IEP/2016/Integrated-Energy-Plan-Report.
pdf; Zaid S. AlOtaibi, Hussam I. Khonkar, Ahmed O. AlAmoudi,
and Saad H. Alqahtani, “Current Status and Future Perspectives
for Localizing The Solar Photovoltaic Industry in The Kingdom
Of Saudi Arabia,” Energy Transitions 4, no. 1 (June 2020); 1-9,
doi:10.1007/s41825-019-00020-y; Thomas Hebo Larsen and
Ulrich Elmer Hansen, “Sustainable Industrialization in Africa: The
Localization of Wind-Turbine Component Production in South
Africa” Innovation and Development (January 27, 2020), doi:10.10
80/2157930x.2020.1720937.

regulators), whose interests, often wrongfully, are equated
with those of the corporate entity in the forefront of attaining sustainable mining. Moreover, impact investing capital
allocated to solving sustainable challenges is on the rise
too.33 Climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the
ESG wave have catalyzed a new set of investor actions (to
which board of directors should be accountable to) that
can positively and directly impact people and planet.
To inform the update of the AMV or African’s industrialization policies in general, extensive consultations must
be undertaken with boards of directors and strategists at
mining companies and along their value chains, operation
managers in Africa, institutional investors, industrialization
and business development experts, as well as with international institutions accompanying policy developments
in Africa, such as UNECA, UNIDO, AfDB and AU. CCSI’s view
is that research on four fronts should serve as the basis for
a climate-smart update of the AMV:
1.

Understanding the extent to which the rise in carbon
costs, the COVID-19 crisis, and the rising pressure of
institutional investors has already reshaped and may
reshape global value chains.

2.

Identifying the extent to which Africa is well-positioned to take advantage of any trends toward regionalization of minerals-based global value chains.

3.

Providing policy recommendations to governments,
the mining industry, directing boards, and institutional investors in Africa to help maximize the benefit
from trends resulting from climate policy by supporting the participation of African countries in the global
supply chains of critical minerals, thus contributing to
achieving SDGs and the AMV.

4. Fostering a new governance framework that engages
all stakeholders—comprising governments, mining
companies, mining company boards, shareholders,
impact investors, and affected communities—in a
constructive dialogue to create sustainable supply
chains adaptable to shifting ESG-related demands.

33 Yasemin Saltuk Lamy, Christina Leijonhufvud, and Nick
O’Donohoe, “The Next 10 Years of Impact Investment,” Stanford
Social Innovation Review (March 2021), https://ssir.org/articles/
entry/the_next_10_years_of_impact_investment.
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